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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
— vs.— 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant, Felt Syndi-
cate, Inc., and petitions this Honorable Court for rehear-
ing in the above-entitled cause, and for an order vacating 
the denial of the appeal of Felt and affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court with respect to the miscel-
laneous account assigned to Wright-Wirthlin Company 
to secure the payment of a debt owed by Felt to Wright-
Wirthlin. This petition is based upon the following 
grounds: 
Case 
No. 8736 
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1. The interpretation given Rule 54(c) (1) violates 
the language of the rule, obviates responsive pleading, 
nullifies Rules 2(c) and 12(h), ignores the "notice" 
philosophy of the Rules, and provides a means whereby 
a dilatory defendant may avoid a rightful judgment 
against him. 
2. The approval of the trial court's finding that Felt 
Syndicate, Inc., is not the real party in interest is con-
trary to all the evidence and contrary to the language of 
the written instrument of assignment. As a matter of 
law, an assignment for security does not make* petitioner 
an improper party incapable of pursuing the remedy for 
itself and its assignee. 
3. Even if amendment to include Wright-Wirthlin 
as a party should be permitted, the amendment relates 
back to the time of filing and Wright-Wirthlin is not 
barred by the limitations in the bond. 
Accompanying this petition and filed herewith is a 
brief in support thereof. 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
We hereby certify that we are the attorneys for the 
appellant, petitioner herein and in our opinion there is 
good cause to believe that the judgment objected to is 
•2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erroneous and that the case ought to be reexamined as 
prayed for in said petition. 
Dated this day of June, 1958. 
Woodrow D. White 
C. Preston Allen 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
In its decision affirming the judgment of the trial 
court, based upon the default of Cassady, this Court es-
tablished and acknowledged the right of Felt to recover 
the damages flowing from that default; however, in disal-
lowing the appeal of Felt, the Court permits the defend-
ant to escape and avoid without payment the major part 
of its obligation. Strong and cogent reasons should pre-
vail in order to induce this Court to extinguish a substan-
tive right after recognizing it ; and we earnestly and re-
spectfully submit that grave injustice is accomplished 
through the denial to Felt of the right to recover the 
major part of its contractual remedy from Cassady, be-
cause of technical defenses which were not supported by 
the record and which were waived in the court below 
through non-assertion by the defendant. This is not a 
situation where because of the existence of a real party 
in interest outside of the lawsuit the defendant is sub-
jected to the risk of being required to pay its obligation 
twice — it is rather a situation wThere the defendant is 
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relieved of the duty of paying a just obligation once, be-
cause of the unasserted and unproved defense that the 
assignor of a claim for security only, contrary to the great 
weight of ^authority, was not the real party in interest; 
and the anomalous result of the holding is to deprive both 
of the interested parties of any remedy at all. Despite 
the fact that Hartford waived this defense by failing to 
plead it, the Court reinstated the defense and declared 
the major part of the action to be barred. 
This holding is so contrary on three grounds to prac-
tically unanimous authority, including Utah law, that it 
can only be viewed as an oversight on the part of the 
Court at the conclusion of a factually difficult case. 
The petitioner, Felt Syndicate, Inc., respectfully 
urges the Court to reconsider its holding concerning 
Felt 's appeal in this cause, not only to prevent injustice 
to petitioner, but also to preserve the integrity of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in future cases. Petitioner 
submits new and additional authorities herein and prays 
a reexamination of its brief on appeal, for we are firmly 
convinced that the decision of this Court as it now stands 
is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPROVAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT F E L T SYNDICATE, INC., IS 
NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS 
CONTRARY TO ALL THE EVIDENCE AND 
CONTRARY TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
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WRITTEN INSTRUMENT OF ASSIGNMENT. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AN ASSIGNMENT 
FOR SECURITY DOES NOT MAKE PETI -
TIONER AN IMPROPER PARTY INCAP-
ABLE OF PURSUING THE REMEDY FOR 
I T S E L F AND ITS ASSIGNEE. 
The only evidence available indicates that Felt Syn-
dicate, Inc., retained an interest in the chose assigned. 
The actions of the parties, the language of the instru-
ment and the present status of the obligation between 
Felt and Wright-Wirthlin leave no doubt but that the 
assignment was for purposes of security only. The in-
strument of assignment in the case at bar recites on its 
face that it was the mutual intention of Felt and the 
assignee to secure the obligation due the assignee by 
Fel t ; and paragraph 5 of the instrument of assign-
ment states that it is understood and agreed that nothing 
therein contained shall be construed to waive or impair 
any right which the assignee might have to the full and 
complete debt. I t is, therefore, clear from the instru-
ment itself that the assignment was not given in pay-
ment of a debt, but as security for it — the debt still 
remained in the full amount, by the terms of the assign-
ment itself. The evidence was therefore clear that the 
assignment was for security only and there was no 
evidence to the contrary. These facts are established 
without controversy and are admitted by all parties to 
the proceeding, and this Court goes beyond the evidence 
in assuming that the lower court has adopted a finding 
based upon non-existent proof to the contrary. This 
Court states in its opinion that evidence which would 
controvert a written instrument must be proved by clear 
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and convincing evidence and then decides that the 
assignment leaves no property rights in the assignor 
despite the language of the assignment itself, and de-
spite the fact that there was no evidence to the contrary 
It is true that the trial court erroneously ruled and 
concluded from this evidence that the making of the 
assignment for security only, as a matter of law, de-
prived Felt of the right to prosecute the claim as a real 
party in interest. We strongly contend that to hold the 
assignment as one for security does not controvert or 
vary its terms, but reaffirms them. 
The case of National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. 
DSRGRR Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, footnoted in the 
Court's decision, is not contrary to any of the decisions 
set forth in this brief. That case did not involve the 
assignment of a cause of action for security only as in 
the case at bar. 
Petitioner does not disagree with the apparently 
major premise of the court's syllogism, i.e., that a n 
assignment for security gives the assignee standing to 
sue on the obligation. However, the conclusion that such 
an assignment therefore divests the assignor of such 
right is not justified. Other courts have recognized this. 
A case clearly in point is that of Turner v. New 
Brunswick Fire Insurance Co., 45 N.M. 126, 112 P. 2d 
511, from which we quote as follows: 
"The plaintiffs meet the defendant's conten-
tion squarely on the merits. They make no claim, 
as defendant seems to have anticipated, that the 
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policy provision stipulating a one-year limitation 
period is void because it shortens the statutory 
period of six years for commencing actions on 
written contracts. We have held such a contention 
is not well taken. Electric Gin Co. v. Firemen's 
Fund Insurance Co., 39 N.M. 73, 39 P. 2d 1024. 
They argue vigorously, however, that an assign-
ment for security only leaves assignor the equi-
table and beneficial owner of the chose assigned 
and that he still may maintain an action in his 
own name as the real party in interest. In this 
contention we think that plaintiffs are correct. 
Stackpole v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 181 Cal. 
700, 186 P. 354; Storm & Butts v. Lipscomb, 117 
Cal. App. 6, 3 P. 2d 567; Globe & Rutgers Fire In-
surance Co. v. Jewell-Loudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App. 
538, 137 S.E. 286; Grubaugli v. Simon J. Murphy 
Co., 209 Mich. 551, 177 N.W. 217; Louk v. Patten, 
58 Idaho 334, 73 P. 2d 949; Ford Hospital v. Fi-
delity & Casualty Co., 106 Neb. 311, 183 N.W. 656; 
Allen v. Protected Home Circle, 112 Kan. 576, 212 
P. 95; Griffey v. New York Cent. Ins. Co., 100 N.Y. 
417, 3 N.E. 309, 53 Am. Rep. 202; Lang v. Eagle 
Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.S. 539; Mer-
cantile Trust Co. v. Gimbernat, 143 App. Div., 305, 
128 N.Y.S. 751; Collins v. McWilliams, 185 App. 
Div. 712, 173 N.Y.S. 850. See, also, text dis-
cussions in 8 Couch on Insurance, Sec. 2056 
and 6 C.J.S., Sec. 122, page 1169, under Assign-
ments. * * * 
•" (5, 6) I t is claimed the plaintiffs fail to meet 
either of these tests. We think they meet both. 
The assignments being for security only, the plain-
tiffs remained the beneficial owners of the right 
to be enforced. At any given time, by paying to 
the assignee named the debt due him, the plain-
tiffs could lift the pledge from so much of the pro-
ceeds of the policy as the amount stipulated in the 
particular assignment. And, by aquiescing in the 
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maintenance of the suit by plaintiffs, a fact fully 
established by reassignments from each assignee, 
a judgment in plaintiff's favor or against them, 
would be res adjudicata on the assignees. Cam-
den Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Eckel, Tex. Com. App. 14 
S.W. 2d 1020. Allen v. Protected Home Circle, 
supra. The fact that the reassignments were exe-
cuted more than a year after the fire would not 
constitute the suit a new one by plaintiffs from 
the time of such reassignments so as to bar the 
right of action under the limitation period con-
tained in the policy, if such reassignments were 
deemed essential to make of plaintiffs real parties 
in interest, contrary to our conclusion. Camden 
Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Eckel, supra. If the defendant 
felt that it required protection as against the 
assignees, in the event the assignments were for 
collateral, as they proved to be, it had the privi-
lege of pleading a defect of parties, in that the 
assignees were not joined. Collins v. McWilliams, 
185 App. Div. 712, 173 N.Y.S. 850. And the stat-
utes governing on intervention were open to as-
signees, had they not chosen to indicate their po-
sition through reassignments. Mountain Timber 
Co. v. Lumber Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 243,169 P. 591." 
The foregoing quotation shows a recognition of two 
real parties in interest in a situation identical in prin-
cipal with the case at bar, and each party is held to have 
the right to pursue remedies for injuries to its special 
property interest, and the New Mexico case cites numer-
ous cases to the same effect; and, indeed, in our research 
we have found no cases to the contrary. 
A New York case cited by the New Mexico case is 
that of Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, 42 N.Y.S. 
539, from which we quote as follows: 
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<<• # • <rpjie ^hird point urged upon the atten-. 
tion of the court is that the plaintiff is not the 
real party in interest, and, therefore, not entitled 
to maintain this action. The evidence in the case 
discloses the fact that, upon the day following the 
fire, the plaintiff assigned to his mother all moneys 
due and owing him, or to become due and owing 
him, upon the policy in suit. But it further appears 
that such assignment was not an absolute one, but 
was intended merely as collateral to an indebted-
ness which the plaintiff owed his mother. And this, 
of itself, would be a sufficient answer to the de-
fendant's contention; for, if the plaintiff's right 
of action against the defendant was pledged as col-
lateral security merely, he undoubtedly retained 
sufficient interest therein to entitle him to maintain 
this action.' " 
To the same effect is Louk v. Patten (Ida.), 73 P. 2d 
948, where the judgment creditor assigned the judgment 
to her attorney to secure payment of attorney's fees. In 
that case the court said (page 951) : 
" . . . The rule is stated in Uhlig v. Dief endorf, 
53 Ida. 676, 26 P. 2d 801, 804, as follows: 
" 'In the case of Globe & Rutgers Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Jewell-Loudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App. 
538, 137 S.E. 286, we find the following: 
" 'An assignor of a chose in action, who has 
assigned the legal title thereto to another as secur-
ity for a debt, has such an interest therein that he 
may maintain a suit thereon in his own name. ' " 
The Supreme Court of Michigan follows this same 
principle in the case of Grubaugh v. Simon J. Murphy Co. 
(Mich.), 177 N.W. 217. 
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In Storm & Butts v. Lipscomb (Cal.), 3 P. 2d 567, 
the plaintiff original contractors assigned the contract 
as security; and they were held to be proper parties 
plaintiff in an action against a subcontractor and surety 
for breach of contract. The case cites several previous 
California decisions to the same effect at page 571. 
See also Griffey v. New York Central Insurance Co., 
100 NY. 417, 3 N.E. 309. 
This Court, if it reversed the trial court 's decision on 
this point, would not be exposing the defendant to the 
danger of paying its debt twice. The reassignment clearly 
authorizes the judgment debtor to pay the full amount 
of the claim to Felt — not that the reassignment revives a 
stale claim in the hands of Wright-Wirthlin, as this 
Court erroneously supposes; but on the contrary Wright-
Wirthlin's right to participate in the recovery (had there 
been no reassignment) was protected by the filing of the 
suit by Felt within the limitation period contained in the 
bond. This leads us into our discussion of Point I I . 
POINT II . 
EVEN I F AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE 
WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN AS A PARTY SHOULD 
. BE PERMITTED, THE AMENDMENT RE-
LATES BACK TO THE TIME OF FILING 
. . .AND WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN IS NOT BARRED 
BY LIMITATIONS IN THE BOND. 
Even if the defendant's objection is allowed after the 
trial is well under way, the amendment to join another 
party should relate back to prevent injustice by the 
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running of limitations. The action was begun by Felt 
for the use and benefit of itself and Wright-Wirthlin 
and a subsequent amendment to include Wright-Wirth-
lin for the benefit of the defendant should relate back to 
the filing of the complaint. Kansas Electric Power Co. of 
Leavenivorth, Kansas v. Janis, 194 F. 2d 942; McDonald 
v. Nebraska, 101 F. 171; American Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 190 F. 2d 234. Again we 
find no authority to the contrary. 
In the New Mexico case, as appears from the quota-
tion set forth above, there was a reassignment involved 
after the limitation period provided for in the fire insur-
ance policy, and the court held: 
"The fact that the reassignments were exe-
cuted more than a year after the fire would not 
constitute the suit a new one by plaintiffs from 
the time of such reassignments so as to bar the 
right of action under the limitation period con-
tained in the policy, if such reassignments were 
deemed essential to make of plaintiffs real parties 
in interest, contrary to our conclusion.'' 
In the light of these decisions we strongly urge that 
this Court erred in concluding in its opinion that the claim 
assigned as security to Wright-Wirthlin was barred by 
limitations contained in the bond, and that such claim 
could not be revived by reassignment to Felt; and we 
earnestly implore this Court to reexamine its position in 
this respect and to review the authorities cited in the 
New Mexico decision, in order to determine whether the 
position of this Court in the interest of justice should be 
corrected. 
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POINT III. 
THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN RULE 54(c) 
(1) VIOLATES THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
RULE, OBVIATES RESPONSIVE PLEAD-
ING, NULLIFIES RULES 8(c) AND 12 (h), 
IGNORES THE "NOTICE" PHILOSOPHY OF 
THE RULES, AND PROVIDES A MEANS 
WHEREBY A DILATORY DEFENDANT MAY 
AVOID A RIGHTFUL JUDGMENT AGAINST 
HIM. 
Rule 54(c) is relied upon as giving the court the 
power to reinstate a defense waived by the defendant 
in that: 
" . . . every final judgment shall grant the re-
lief to which the party in whose favor it is ren-
dered is entitled, even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in his pleadings. . . . " 
In this case, relief was not granted the prevailing 
party, as the rule permits, but rather to the defendant,, 
against whom judgment was taken. We further find no 
precedent for the conclusion that a party is entitled to a 
reinstatement of a defense which he has waived under 
Rule 12(h) by failing to present it. Even under the most 
liberal view, the most that defendant was entitled to, as 
will be later shown, was to have Wright-Wirthlin appear 
as a party of record. Defendant was not entitled to a 
release of its unpaid obligation. 
;..;; It has been consistently held by the federal courts 
oinder the Federal Rules that Rule 17(a) (the real party 
in interest rule) is for the benefit of the defendant and 
the right to have the real party in interest on the record 
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as plaintiff is a right which may be waived by defendant. 
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 19 F.K. Serv. 
17 a.44, Case 1; National Garment Co. v. New York, Chi-
cago & St. Louis R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32; Capital Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Langhorne, 146 F. 2d 237. Where there has been 
a partial assignment so that there are two parties in 
interest, full recovery, impressed with a trust as to the 
absent party, may be obtained by the plaintiff where 
defendant makes no proper objection. Norwich Union 
Fire Ins. Society v. Standard Oil Co., 59 F. 984; Fair-
grieve et al. v. Marine Ins. Co. of London, 94 F. 686. 
The only reason for preventing suit by a partial 
subrogee alone is to preclude inconvenience and expense 
to a defendant who might be required to defend a num-
ber of separate suits arising out of a single claim, 
and hence defendant is the one who should make a timely 
claim to join necessary parties. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. U. S., 
171 F. 2d 374. 
The real party in interest statutes are a mere con-
venience to the defendant, abrogating in some instances 
the common law rule. To hold that by delay in asserting 
a merely procedural right in himself a defendant may 
rid himself of a substantive claim provides an inequitable 
reward to an unfair litigant. The fact that Felt Syndicate 
was a proper party to the litigation is sufficient to permit 
judgment for the full amount. 
If a timely motion had been made, Wright-Wirthlin 
could have been joined as a party and this matter con-
cluded. The issue was not raised until Felt had rested 
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its case. Wright-Wirthlin did not enter the litigation 
because of its interpretation of the assignment as one for 
security only; it did not allow its claim to "become s ta le" 
for it looked to Felt for payment of its claim. Notice to 
Felt that Hartford considered the assignment a breach 
could in no way give notice that Hartford considered Felt 
an improper party as to a portion of the debt. 
Under this " l ibe ra l " interpretation of the rules, the 
court may reinstate any defense which the defendant has 
waived and the provisions of Rules 2(c) and 12(h) have 
no significance. 
The court ignored in its opinion the only Utah case 
precisely in point, Fritz v. The Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209, which holds: 
"The objection that the plaintiff in an action is not 
" the real party in interest," as required by our 
Code, when available by way of defense, must be 
raised by answer or it will be considered to have 
been waived." 
The Utah Rules did not change this concept. The 
holding is contrary to the law of all jurisdictions avail-
able to research. 
ANSWER TO HARTFORD'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Hartford 's petition for rehearing, its brief and 
argument, conveniently and consistently fail to discuss 
in what manner the trial court has erred in its findings 
of fact and decree and tenaciously clings to reiterating and 
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re-arguing controverted facts which have heretofore been 
resolved against it. We do not believe a re-argument of 
the facts would be helpful to the Court, but, in answer 
to Hartford's petition, would incorporate here by refer-
ence the applicable portions of our original brief and the 
briefs of able counsel for Prudential. 
We deem it appropriate to draw to the attention of 
the Court the fact that Hartford has impliedly confessed 
the rightfulness of this Court's opinion on the points 
raised in its petition through the absence of citations 
evidencing precedents in support of its position, with the 
exception of the subsidiary issue of the forfeiture of 
Felt's rights to do an intrastate business. The citation 
made by Hartford relates to entirely different statutory 
provisions existing in a foreign jurisdiction and is not 
inconsistent or contradictory to this Court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
By reason of the facts and principles asserted in the 
foregoing brief, we, therefore, respectfully conclude that 
the fundamental principles of justice and equity require 
that this Court reconsider its judgment in this matter 
and grant unto the appellant, Felt Syndicate, Inc., a re-
hearing and a reversal of the judgment of the trial court 
with respect to the amount of damages in accordance with 
Felt's appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODEOW D. WHITE 
C. PEESTON ALLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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